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Gabriela Aguirre Fernández

Resumen

Este trabajo analiza las consecuencias en la rendición de cuentas electoral cuando existen escándalos de corrupción cometidos por miembros del gobierno, en particular, por integrantes del Poder Ejecutivo (presidente y círculo cercano), un año antes de las elecciones presidenciales en 18 países de América Latina. El argumento principal señala que las probabilidades de sanción aumentan en la medida que incrementa la diferencia ideológica entre el partido gobernante y el principal opositor. Los resultados confirman en gran medida lo anterior. La diferencia ideológica es la variable que permite hacer una conexión entre el voto de castigo y la presencia de escándalos cometidos por integrantes del gobierno. Si esta variable no se toma en cuenta, no se encuentra ningún efecto.

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Cómo citar
Aguirre Fernández, G. (2023). ¿Cuándo se sancionan los escándalos de corrupción cometidos por el gobierno? Una explicación desde la diferencia ideológica. Apuntes Electorales, 22(69), 181-218. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.53985/ae.v22i69.891
Sección
Investigaciones
Biografía del autor/a

Gabriela Aguirre Fernández, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales

Doctora en Ciencias Sociales con Especialidad en Ciencia Política por la Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Flacso), sede México. Sus líneas de investigación son partidos políticos y sistemas electorales en América Latina y comportamiento electoral. 

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